Counterparties in healthcare, payments, and enterprise compliance need to verify regulated claims — medical necessity, cardholder scope, control attestation — but every disclosure regime disqualifies the underlying data from crossing the wire. A PrivacyCore™ zero-knowledge credential proves the policy claim while the PHI, the PAN, and the auditor's working papers stay sealed. The disclosure boundary is the same primitive across all three.
The same privacy-rail primitive adapts to each disclosure boundary: a scoped credential, a policy-bound workflow, and a verifier that receives the decision without the source record.
| Vertical | Credential | Scope | Workflow / use case | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIPAA | patient_consent_v1 |
Patient consent and clinical attestation for a scoped prior-authorization claim; PHI remains with the issuer. | A clinical issuer proves a policy-bound consent claim; a payer or clearinghouse verifies it without receiving the clinical witness. | Read detail → |
| PCI DSS | cardholder_scope_v2 |
Attested cardholder-data environment (CDE) scope, including tokenization, key custody, and logging posture; PAN and CVV stay sealed. | A merchant or payment issuer proves scoped payment compliance; an acquirer or payment partner verifies it without receiving cardholder data. | Read detail → |
| SOC 2 | control_attestation_v1 |
A bounded privileged-access review against a published SOC 2 control policy; logs, tickets, topology, and working papers stay sealed. | A control owner proves review and remediation for an audit window; a customer or auditor verifies the attestation without receiving the operational witness. | Read detail → |
The data principal — a covered entity, a payments processor, a control attestor — encrypts the regulated artifact (PHI, cardholder data, control narrative) under a published partner policy hash. The ciphertext never carries the plaintext; the partner never holds the decryption key for it.
{
"claim_id": "clm_reg_01K…4J",
"subject_pubkey": "pk_partner_8d2e…f01a",
"policy_hash": "0x9c4f…ab21",
"ciphertext": "0x7b21d8e9…" /* encrypted payload */
}
A locally-executed circuit attests that the encrypted artifact satisfies the regulator's disclosure rule — medical necessity, cardholder scope, or control attestation — against the partner's published policy hash. The verifier learns only that the claim is true; the witness never leaves the prover.
proof = prove(
circuit = "policy_attestation_v1",
witness = decrypted_artifact, // stays on prover
public = { policy_hash, partner_id, claim_type }
)
// → ~24 kB Groth16 proof, single-use, revocable
The party that must rely on the claim — a payer, an acquirer, a downstream auditor — verifies the proof against the same published policy hash. The artifact stays sealed. The disclosure regime is satisfied by the cryptographic shape of the proof itself.
curl -X POST https://partner.example/verify \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{ "claim_id": "clm_reg_01K…4J", "proof": "0x8a2…" }'
# → 200 OK, valid=true, disclosure_boundary=sealed
HIPAA's minimum-necessary standard disqualifies full medical records from crossing a payer / clearinghouse boundary. The PrivacyCore™ proof attests to the regulatory claim while the clinical detail stays inside the covered entity.
A payer must confirm medical necessity before authorizing a procedure — but HIPAA forbids the clinical record leaving the provider.
Proves a procedure meets the payer's medical-necessity policy hash — diagnosis, treatment pathway, and prior-authorization status cryptographically attested.
PHI never crosses the wire: no diagnosis codes, no chart, no provider notes. The payer authorizes on the proof alone.
PCI's cardholder-data environment (CDE) boundary is enforced by infrastructure — but the credential layer lets a counterparty attest to it cryptographically, without ever holding the PAN.
An acquirer must verify that a merchant endpoint is inside PCI scope — but PCI forbids the full PAN from ever reaching the verifier.
Proves a transaction handled cardholder data inside an attested CDE with the right tokenization, key-custody, and logging posture — no PAN traversal.
PAN, CVV, and full track data never reach the verifier. The proof attests the scoped handling without exposing what was scoped.
SOC 2 reports summarize an auditor's opinion over a trust-service-criteria set — but the working papers behind that opinion are confidential. The credential attests to the published control set, not the sampling methodology that confirmed it.
A downstream customer must inherit the audited posture to skip their own SIG / vendor questionnaire — without the auditor's confidential working papers ever leaving the audit firm.
Proves coverage across a published trust-service-criteria set (Security / Availability / Confidentiality / Processing Integrity / Privacy) for an attested audit window.
Auditor's working papers, control-test sampling, and any material-weakness narrative remain sealed. The downstream inherits the cover; they never see the pages.
These examples describe scoped disclosure boundaries: what a partner can verify, what remains sealed, and how to continue the conversation without treating an illustrative scenario as a certification.
They prove a bounded, policy-bound claim — not the underlying record: the HIPAA medical-necessity flow, the PCI DSS cardholder-data environment (CDE) scope, or the SOC 2 control attestation described by the published policy.
PHI and clinical records stay sealed; so do PAN, CVV, full track data, and CDE evidence. Internal topology, identities, logs, tickets, sampling, and audit working papers also remain on the prover or auditor side of the boundary.
No. They are illustrative proof shapes for partner discussion, not HIPAA, PCI DSS, or SOC 2 certification, legal advice, or a compliance determination.
Continue with the HIPAA detail page, PCI DSS detail page, or SOC 2 detail page; for sensitive agent-side computation over regulated inputs, read the FHE workflow; for the integration shape, read the KAIOS partner specification.
Whether you sit in healthcare, payments, or enterprise compliance — the disclosure regime is the same primitive: prove the regulated claim, never move the data. Read the deep explainer, pull the partner spec, or open a POC to scope an integration against your regulator.